Like anywhere, depends on the area/day/etc
You may be dealing more with Corp land than "public" land, depending on your area
Wouldn't this only be true if you were near a corps lake?
I've never really thought about this, but I guess since the river is public, then the public can hunt the river bottom just like they can move up and down the river bottom to fish?
What are the implications of shooting in the river bottom? Are you practically restricted to bow hunting or maybe a slug gun?
I would check with the local game warden before doing this to see how they would view it before doing it. There was a case out of the Corpus Christi court of appeals a few years ago, where a guy was hunting the tide lands which are public property and the GW cited him for hunting without landowner permission saying he'd crossed over onto adjacent private property. The guy took it up to the Court of Appeals which ruled that even if he was on public property when cited he was still guilty of hunting without landowner permission since the public ground he was on wasn't listed in the annual public lands book he didn't have permission to hunt it.
Find the case, and post it here. Could not have happened this way, since not all public lands are listed as "public lands hunt" land. I would encourage the OP to throw himself fully into reading the laws, knowing the terminology and being certain where you are at all times. I would have missed out on some great hunts and really good deer if I had not done this myself.
Here's a cut and past of the case from westlaw. It can also be googled with the volume and page of "76 SW3d 537"
76 S.W.3d 537
Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.
Bryan C. HARRISON, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
John G. BENAVIDES, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Nos. 13–01–547–CR, 13–01–548–CR.
March 7, 2002.
Synopsis
Defendants were convicted upon pleas of nolo contendere in the 36th Judicial District Court, Aransas County, Joel B. Johnson, J., of taking wildlife resource without consent of landowner. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, Yanez, J., held that: (1) indictments did not need to specifically allege that land on which offenses occurred was private, and (2) erroneous alternative allegation that defendants acted recklessly was not fatal defect, when indictments also correctly alleged intentional or knowing mental states.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes (7)
Collapse West Headnotes
Change View
1
Criminal LawDisplay Key Number TopicsAmendments and rulings as to indictment or pleas
Appellate court will review a challenge to a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash an indictment under an abuse of discretion standard.
1 Case that cites this headnote
2
Indictments and Charging InstrumentsDisplay Key Number TopicsNature, Elements, and Incidents of Offenses in General
In general, an indictment must plead any element that must be proved at trial. Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 21.03.
3
Indictments and Charging InstrumentsDisplay Key Number TopicsPurpose of Accusation
Indictments and Charging InstrumentsDisplay Key Number TopicsNature, Elements, and Incidents of Offenses in General
Indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged, fairly inform the defendant of charges he must prepare to meet, and enable the defendant to plead acquittal or conviction in bar to future prosecution for the same offense. Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 21.11.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
4
Criminal LawDisplay Key Number TopicsRequisites and sufficiency of accusation
When construing an indictment, an appellate court will read the indictment as a whole, applying practical, rather than technical considerations.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
5
GameDisplay Key Number TopicsCriminal prosecutions
Parks and Wildlife Code provision prohibiting hunting without consent of landowner or landowner's agent applied to all lands in Texas, private or public, and thus indictments alleging such offenses did not need to specifically allege that land on which offenses occurred was private, but rather allegations that defendants intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly hunted, killed and possessed wildlife resource, namely white-tailed deer, at particular place, without consent of landowner or landowner's agent, was sufficient, given that Parks and Wildlife Code also provided means by which person could acquire permission from state to hunt on property owned by state. V.T.C.A., Parks & Wildlife Code §§ 61.022, 62.062, 81.403; Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 21.03.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
6
GameDisplay Key Number TopicsCriminal prosecutions
Indictments correctly alleged mental state required for hunting without consent of landowner or landowner's agent by alleging that defendants acted intentionally or knowingly, and thus erroneous alternative allegation that defendants acted recklessly was not fatal defect, given that hunting was not, by nature, criminal act, statute prohibiting hunting without consent of landowner or agent did not prohibit specific result, instead, what made hunting or possessing wildlife resource criminal act under statute was that it was done without consent, and indictments fairly informed defendants of charges and enabled defendants to plead acquittal or conviction in bar to future prosecution for same offenses. V.T.C.A., Parks & Wildlife Code § 61.022(a).
5 Cases that cite this headnote
7
GameDisplay Key Number TopicsOffenses
Culpable mental state was required to convict defendants of violation of statute that prohibited hunting or possessing wildlife resources without consent of landowner, given that under statute, criminal act was circumstance, namely that taking or possessing was done without landowner's consent; to be convicted under statute prohibiting taking wildlife resources without consent of landowner, defendants had to be shown to have been acting without consent of owner, or owner's agent, and must have known that he was acting without owner's consent. V.T.C.A., Parks & Wildlife Code § 61.022.
4 Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*539 David L. Cunningham, Killian, Hayden & Cunningham, San Antonio, for Appellant.
Patrick L. Flanigan, Dist. Atty., Sinton, for Appellee.
Before Justices DORSEY, YAÑEZ, and CASTILLO.
OPINION
YANEZ, Justice.
Appellants were indicted for the state jail felony offense of taking a wildlife resource without the consent of the landowner.1 See TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN.. § 61.022 (Vernon Supp.2002). Both appellants moved to quash their indictments. When the court denied the appellants' motions, they pleaded nolo contendere. In one point of error, appellants now argue that the trial court erred by denying their motions to quash the indictments. Because the point of error raised by each appellant and the facts surrounding each appellant's appeal are identical, we will address them together in this one opinion. We affirm.
1 Appellants argue that the indictments in their cases failed to allege: (1) appellants knew the property on which the offenses were committed was private property; (2) the landowner did not give consent to hunt, kill, or possess wildlife resources on the property; and (3) the appellants knew that the landowner had not consented.2 We review a challenge to a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash an indictment under an abuse of discretion standard. Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
234 In general, an indictment must plead any element that must be proved at trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 21.03 (Vernon 1989); Green v. State, 951 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). An indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged, fairly inform the defendant of charges he must prepare to meet, and enable the defendant to plead acquittal or conviction in bar to future prosecution for the same offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 21.11 (Vernon 1989); Sanchez v. State, 928 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.). When construing an indictment, we read the indictment as a whole, applying practical, rather than technical considerations. Oliver v. State, 692 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Soto v. State, 623 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
5 Under the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code, no one “may hunt or catch by any means or method or possess a wildlife resource at any time and at any place covered by this chapter unless the owner of the land or water, or the owner's agent, consents.” TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN.. § 61.022(a) (Vernon Supp.2002) (emphasis added). Chapter 61 of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code does not apply solely to *540 private property but applies to every “county” and “place” in the state. TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN.. § 61.003 (Vernon Supp.2002). On its face, the code prohibits hunting anywhere within the State of Texas without the consent of the owner of the land or the owner's agent. This would apply to public lands also. 3 Thus, a person needs the consent of a landowner, or the landowner's agent, to hunt anywhere in Texas. Therefore, an indictment for the violation of section 61.022 need not allege that the offense took place on private property: the indictment need only allege that the person hunted, caught or possessed a wildlife resource in a county or place in Texas, and was acting without the consent of the landowner.4 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 21.03 (Vernon 1989); Green, 951 S.W.2d at 4.
The indictments at issue state that the appellants “did ... intentionally, knowingly and recklessly hunt, kill and possess a wildlife resource, to wit: one white-tailed deer, on San Jose Island, without the consent of the landowner's agent ....” The indictments correctly charge the appellants with hunting and possessing a wildlife resource in a county or place in the state, without the consent of the landowner's agent. See TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN.. § 61.022 (Vernon 2002).
6 Appellants contend that the State must prove that appellants knew they were hunting without the consent of the landowner's agent and, appellants argue, the indictments do not allege that they were hunting without the consent of the landowner or the owner's agent.
The State concedes that, had these cases gone to trial, it would have been required to prove that the appellants knew they were acting without the consent of the landowner, or landowner's agent. Both the State and the appellants agree that when otherwise innocent behavior becomes criminal because of the circumstances under which the behavior occurs, a culpable mental state is required as to those circumstances, citing McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). In McQueen, a case involving the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, the court of criminal appeals recognized that conduct may be rendered criminal based on: (1) the nature of the conduct; (2) the result of the conduct; or (3) the circumstances surrounding the conduct. Id. The court of criminal appeals recognized that the act of using a motor vehicle is not criminal by nature, and further, the section of the penal code dealing with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle does not prohibit any specific result of the use of a motor vehicle. Id. The McQueen court held that what renders the use of another person's motor vehicle a criminal act is “that it is done under certain circumstances, i.e., without the owner's permission.” Id. The court of criminal appeals held that “where otherwise innocent behavior becomes criminal because of the circumstances under which it is done, a culpable mental state is required as to those surrounding circumstances.” McQueen, 781 S.W.2d at 603 (citing *541 McClain v. State, 687 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (what separates lawful acquisitive conduct from theft is knowledge of a circumstance surrounding the conduct, that it is without the owner's consent)).
7 We agree that the crime of taking wildlife resources without the consent of the landowner under section 61.022 requires a culpable mental state. Hunting is not, by its nature, a criminal act, and section 61.022 does not prohibit any specific result. What makes hunting or possessing a wildlife resource a criminal act under section 61.022 is a circumstance; that it is done without the landowner's consent. Thus, it follows that a person, to be convicted under section 61.022, must be shown to have been acting without the consent of the owner, or the owner's agent, and must have known that he was acting without the owner's consent. However, this does not change the outcome of this case.
The indictments in question sufficiently state the culpable mental states being alleged. A person violates section 61.022 by the intentional act of hunting, catching, or possessing a wildlife resource with the knowledge that he does not have the consent of the landowner, or landowner's agent. TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN.. § 61.022(a) (Vernon Supp.2002). The indictments alleged that the appellants acted “intentionally, knowingly and recklessly” and without the consent of the landowner's agent. The indictments correctly pleaded the mental states necessary for the offense that the State would have been required to prove at trial.
Although appellants do not challenge the inclusion of “recklessly” in the indictment, we note that the incorrect inclusion of “recklessly” in the indictment does not render it fatally defective. Soto, 623 S.W.2d at 939. In Soto, the court of criminal appeals held that an indictment charging aggravated assault was not fatally defective for alleging the culpable mental state “recklessly” as well as the statutorily required culpable mental states “intentionally” or “knowingly.” Id.; see also Kirk v. State, 643 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref'd) (applying Soto; indictment which included “should have been aware,” which was not a culpable mental state prescribed for the offense, not fatally defective). In the appeals now before this Court, as in Soto, no essential element of culpability was omitted in the indictments since the required mental states were alleged. See Soto, 623 S.W.2d at 939.; see also Kirk, 643 S.W.2d at 193. The indictments at issue sufficiently allege the elements of the offense charged, including the culpable mental state, fairly informed appellants of the charges, and enabled the appellants to plead acquittal or conviction in bar to future prosecution for the same offenses.
We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to quash the indictments in the cases now before this Court. We overrule the sole point of error raised by the appellants. The judgments of the trial court are AFFIRMED.
All Citations
76 S.W.3d 537